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This paper examines the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the reporting decisions 
of taxpayers, using microlevel information from the 1984 and 1989 Statistics of Income.  We 
find that tax reform clearly mattered in the reporting decisions of individuals, with reporting 
elasticities that cluster between 0.3 and 0.7.  However, our results also indicate that individuals’ 
estimated responses vary in different ways for individuals with different income levels, in ways 
that differ by the types of incomes received by taxpayers, in ways that are sensitive to the 
estimation approach, and in ways that depend upon data adjustment methods. 
JEL Categories: H24; H31; H3. 





TAXPAYER REPORTING RESPONSES AND THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 
 




A central focus of research in public economics has long been the measurement of 
individual responses to taxation.  There is almost universal agreement among economists that, at 
least in theory, individual behavior should respond in some way to a change in marginal tax rates. 
 In particular, a reduction in marginal tax rates should lead individuals to work more, to save 
more, to reduce tax avoidance activities, to report more income, and the like.  However, it is in 
the area of the magnitude of these responses where there remains enormous disagreement.  
Despite the best efforts of economists, estimates of the sizes of taxpayer responses in such 
dimensions as labor supply, saving, capital gains realizations, charitable contributions, and 
compensation choice are controversial and unsettled.
1  The magnitudes of these responses are 
                                                 
1  For example, see the large differences in estimated behavioral responses in such areas as labor supply, savings, and 
capital gains realizations.  For labor supply responses, see, for example: Jerry A. Hausman, “Labor Supply,” in How 
Taxes Affect Economic Behavior, Henry J. Aaron and Joseph A. Pechman (eds.) (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1981, 27-72); and Thomas MaCurdy, David Green, and Harry J. Paarsch, “Assessing Empirical 
Approaches for Analyzing Taxes and Labor Supply,” Journal of Human Resources 25, No. 2 (1990): 414-490.  For 
savings responses, see: William G. Gale and John Karl Scholz, “IRAs and Household Saving,” The American 
Economic Review 84, No. 5 (1994): 1233-1260; and James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise, “Do 
401(k) Contributions Crowd Out Other Personal Saving?” Journal of Public Economics 58, No. 1 (1995): 1-32.  For 
capital gains responses, see: Martin Feldstein, Joel Slemrod, and Shlomo Yitzhaki, “The Effects of Taxation on the 
Selling of Corporate Stock and the Realization of Capital Gains,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 94 No. 4 
(1980): 777-791; and Leonard Burman and William Randolph, “Measuring Permanent Responses to Capital-gains 
Tax Changes in Panel Data,” The American Economic Review 84, No. 4 (1994): 794-809.  Even in the area of the 
response of marital decisions to the income tax, there remains much controversy.  For detailed reviews of much of 
this work, see: James Alm and Leslie A. Whittington, “Income Taxes and the Marriage Decision,” Applied 
Economics 27, No. 1 (1995): 25-31; Julio Lopez-Laborda and Anabel Zarate-Marco, “To Marry or Not to Marry: 
Tax is the Question,” Public Budgeting & Finance 24, No. 3 (2004): 98-123; and David L. Sjoquist and Mary Beth 
Walker, “The Marriage Tax and the Rate and Timing of Marriage,” National Tax Journal 48, No. 4 (1995): 547-
558.  For a discussion of some of these controversies, see: Joel Slemrod (ed.), Do Taxes Matter? The Impact of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992); and Alan J. Auerbach and Joel Slemrod, “The 
Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,” The Journal of Economic Literature 35, No. 2 (1997): 589-632.   4 
 
essential inputs in the estimation of the revenue effects of changes in the individual income tax, 
at the federal, state, and local levels of government, as well as in estimates of the efficiency and 
distributional effects of tax changes. 
The decade of the 1980s offers some potential for unraveling the puzzle of individual 
responses to tax changes.  There were major tax changes throughout this decade, culminating in 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86).  Many studies have examined various aspects of 
behavioral responses to TRA86, including labor supply (Eissa and Liebman, 1996), saving 
(Skinner and Feenberg, 1992), housing (Follain, Leavens, and Velz, 1993), charitable donations 
(Clotfelter, 1992), capital gains realizations (Burman, Clausing, and O'Hare, 1994), health 
insurance (Gruber and Poterba, 1994), and tax shelters (Samwick, 1996).
2  These studies 
generally find that individuals respond in significant ways to federal income tax changes, 
although there is much debate on whether these responses represent changes in real behavior or 
simply changes in either the timing or the financial form of transactions (Slemrod, 1995).
3 
The responses of individuals to marginal tax rates in their reporting of income on tax 
returns are equally uncertain, and the magnitudes of these responses are a critical issue in 
ongoing policy debates about the effects of income taxation, especially the impact of taxes on the 
                                                 
2  Nada Eissa and Jeffrey B. Liebman, “Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 111, No. 2 (1996): 605-637; Jonathan Skinner and Daniel Feenberg, “Savings,” in Do Taxes 
Matter? The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Joel Slemrod (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992, 50-
79); James R. Follain, Daniel R. Leavens, and Orawin T. Velz, “Identifying the Effects of Tax Reform on 
Multifamily Rental Housing,” Journal of Urban Economics 34, No. 2 (1993): 275-298; Charles Clotfelter, 
“Charitable Contributions,” in Do Taxes Matter? The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, edited by Joel Slemrod 
(ed.) (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992, 203-235); Leonard Burman, Kimberly Clausing, and John O’Hare, 
“Tax Reform and Realizations of Capital Gains in 1986,” National Tax Journal 45, No. 1 (1994): 1-18; Jonathan 
Gruber and James M. Poterba, “Tax Incentives and the Decision to Purchase Health Insurance: Evidence from the 
Self-employed,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, No. 4 (1997): 701-733; and Andrew Samwick, “Tax 
Shelters and Passive Losses after the Tax Reform Act of 1986,” in Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation, 
Martin S. Feldstein and James M. Poterba (eds.) (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996, 193-226). 
3  Joel Slemrod, “Income Creation or Income Shifting? Behavioral Responses to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,” The 5 
 
level of income tax collections.  As in other areas of behavior, reporting responses can be, and 
continue to be, usefully analyzed in the period surrounding TRA86.  In particular, TRA86 
represents a “natural experiment” for the reexamination of individual reporting responses to tax 
changes, in which the structural break associated with the TRA86 allows individual responses to 
be identified independently of other changes in the economic environment.  Feldstein (1995) and 
Auten and Carroll (1999) exploit this natural experiment feature of TRA86 to estimate individual 
reporting changes arising from TRA86, using panel data from individual tax returns.
4  Feldstein 
(1995) finds that the elasticity of reported income with respect to the tax price of reported income 
(defined as one less the marginal tax rate) is quite large, generally in excess of one in his 
preferred estimates.  Auten and Carroll (1999) also estimate large, if somewhat smaller, reported 
income-tax price elasticities.  In contrast, Gruber and Saez (2002) estimate reporting responses to 
the entire set of federal and state tax changes in the 1980s, including TRA86, and they find that 
the overall elasticity is significantly smaller, roughly 0.4; Heim (2009) finds similarly low 
elasticities using more recent tax changes in 2001 and 2003.
5  These studies, as well other studies 
by Lindsey (1987) and Navratil (1995) that somewhat parallel our approach here, generally find 
that individual reporting responses are present.
6  Nevertheless, as emphasized by Giertz (2007) 
                                                                                                                                                             
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85, No. 2 (1995): 175-180. 
4  Martin Feldstein, “The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act,” The Journal of Political Economy 103, No. 2 (1995): 551-576; and Gerald Auten and Robert Carroll, “The 
Effect of Income Taxes on Household Behavior,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 81, No. 4 (1999): 681-
693. 
5  Jonathan Gruber and Emmanuel Saez, “The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications,” Journal of 
Public Economics 84, No. 1 (2002): 1-32; and Bradley T. Heim, “The Effect of Recent Tax Changes on Taxable 
Income: Evidence from a New Panel of Tax Returns,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 9, No. 1 (2009): 
147-163. 
6  Lawrence B. Lindsey, “Individual Taxpayer Response to Tax Cuts: 1982-1984,” Journal of Public Economics 33, 
No. 2 (1987): 173-206; and John F. Navratil, Essays on the Impact of Marginal Tax Rate Reductions on the 
Reporting of Taxable Income on Individual Tax Returns, Ph.D. Dissertation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 
1995).  Both use information from samples of individual tax returns to estimate reporting changes from tax rate 6 
 
and Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2009) in recent surveys of this literature, there remain substantial 
differences in the magnitude of these estimated responses.
7  The U.S. experience is, apparently, 
not an isolated one.
8 
9 
In large part, these differences reflect some fundamental methodological issues (Slemrod, 
1998; Triest, 1998).
10  It is quite difficult to disentangle the role of marginal tax rate changes 
from other events that occurred in the 1980s, especially those non-tax events (e.g., changes in the 
distribution of income, changes in the demands for different skill groups stemming from changes 
in technology or international trade) that increased the income of higher income taxpayers at the 
same that their marginal tax rates were falling.  TRA86 also introduced other complicating 
changes, such as those that encouraged a change in corporation status from “C-corp” to “S-corp” 
and that in turn increased the level of reported taxable income for individuals (Slemrod, 1995).   
                                                                                                                                                             
changes, and they find evidence of significant behavioral responses to changes in marginal tax rates.  Of particular 
relevance to our work is Navratil (1995), who looks at taxpayers before and after TRA86; however, instead of using 
another income group for comparison, he uses a similarly defined group over a period where tax rates did not 
change, ending up by examining behavior over two-year intervals (e.g., 1986 to 1988).  He calculates elasticities 
using a comparison group from years 1984 and 1986, and then again using a comparison group from years 1988 and 
1990, and finally a third time using the average of the two comparison time periods (where federal tax rates do not 
change).  His elasticities are as high as 1 for the top 3 percent of the income distribution, but are much smaller for the 
rest of the distribution. He also finds that the elasticities are quite sensitive to the choice of comparison years and to 
the definition of taxable income.  
7  Seth Giertz, “The Elasticity of Taxable Income over the 1980s and 1990s,” National Tax Journal 60, No. 4 
(2007): 743-768; and Emmanuel Saez, Joel B. Slemrod, and Seth H. Giertz, “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with 
Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review,” NBER Working Paper 15012 (Boston, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2009). 
8  For example, see: Karl Aarbu and Thor Thoreson,“Income Responses to Tax Changes – Evidence from the 
Norwegian Tax Reform,” National Tax Journal 54, No. 2 (2001): 319-334; Mary Anne Sillamaa and Michael Veall, 
“The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1988 Tax Flattening in Canada,” 
Journal of Public Economics 80, No. 4 (2001): 341-356; and Jan Selen, “Taxable Income Response to Tax Changes: 
Evidence from the 1990/91 Swedish Tax Reform,” FIEF Working Paper No. 177 (2002) (Stockholm, Sweden). 
9  It should be noted that this reporting response is not the same as, say, a simple labor supply response.  Although 
reporting behavior will certainly be influenced by any changes in hours worked or in labor force participation rates 
that may occur in response to tax reform, the reporting decision is a far broader decision.  It is affected also by 
behavioral changes in such dimensions as employee compensation, itemized deductions, the realization of incomes, 
tax compliance, and the like.  See Feldstein (1995) for a detailed discussion. 
10  Joel Slemrod, “Methodological Issues in Measuring and Interpreting Taxable Income Elasticities,” National Tax 
Journal 51, No. 4 (1998): 773-788; and Robert Triest, “Econometric Issues in Estimating the Behavioral Response 7 
 
Consequently, despite the many important insights from this work, several questions remain 
unresolved about reporting responses, and the events surrounding TRA86 remain a useful arena 
to examine these responses, especially using alternative data and methods. 
In particular, do the estimated reporting decisions of individuals in response to the tax 
changes in TRA86 differ across the various forms of income that individuals receive and report? 
 Do these estimated responses differ at different points in the distribution of income?  Are these 
estimated responses sensitive to the specific estimation method, especially to methods that treat 
outliers in different ways?  Do these estimated responses depend upon methods that adjust the 
data for any underlying but non-tax-related changes in income that occurred over this period? 
In this paper we present new estimates of the responsiveness of individuals to tax changes 
that address these (and other) questions.  We start with cross-sectional, microlevel information 
from the 1984 and 1989 Statistics of Income of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  We adjust 
these data for non-tax-related income growth that occurred in the 1980s.  We also use measures 
of the marginal tax rate that incorporate both federal and state income taxes.  We then apply 
several different estimation techniques in order to estimate the responses of individuals in their 
reporting of different types of income (e.g., total or “comprehensive” income, adjusted gross 
income, wages and salaries) to the changes in federal and state income taxes reflected in TRA86. 
Our results clearly indicate that TRA86 mattered in the income reporting decisions of 
most individuals, with reported (federal plus state) income-tax price elasticities that generally 
cluster between 0.3 and 0.7.  However, our results also show that the estimated responses of 
individuals to taxes matter in different ways for individuals with different levels of income, in 
                                                                                                                                                             
to Taxation: A Nontechnical Introduction,” National Tax Journal 51, No. 4 (1998): 761-772.   8 
 
ways that depend upon the types of incomes received by taxpayers, and in ways that are sensitive 
to estimation approaches and to adjustments for income distribution changes.  These various 
differences have significant implications for the revenue costs associated with tax changes. 
The next section briefly discusses TRA86.  Data and methods are presented in section 3, 
and results are considered in section 4.  Summary and conclusions are in section 5. 
 
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) was arguably the most comprehensive federal 
income tax reform in the last fifty years.  Its basic features are well known.  First, it sharply 
reduced marginal tax rates on nearly all taxpayers.  The top individual income tax rate was 
reduced from 50 percent to 28 percent, and marginal tax rates for other brackets were also 
substantially reduced.  In total, overall the average marginal tax rate for individuals fell by an 
average of 7 percent on a return-weighted basis.  Second, TRA86 changed a number of features 
in the definition of income, most of which had the effect of greatly expanding the tax base.  For 
example, eligibility for tax savings from individual retirement accounts was restricted, and 
various itemized deductions (e.g., medical expenses, interest expenses, state and local sales 
taxes) were also limited.  In addition, preferential tax treatment of realized capital gains was 
eliminated, and the ability to use passive investment losses as an offset to other forms of income 
was sharply curtailed.  The standard deduction and personal exemptions were also increased. 
In part because of changes in the federal income tax, many states also altered their state 
income taxes (Courant and Gramlich, 1993).
11  Among states that relied heavily on the definition 
                                                 
11 Paul N. Courant and Edward M. Gramlich, “The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on State and Local Fiscal 9 
 
of the income tax base in the federal income tax, a typical state action was to reduce marginal tax 
rates in the state individual income tax, in order to avoid a major income tax increase on state 
citizens.  For a similar reason, another common action was to modify in some way the federal 
base definition.  Some states changed neither their rates nor their definition of the tax base, which 
led to a significant increase in state income taxes. 
The intent of TRA86 was, at least in part, to encourage individuals (and firms) to devote 
more of their efforts to productive activities.  The reduction in marginal tax rates allowed 
individuals to keep more of each dollar of earned income, and reduced incentives to engage in 
activities whose only purpose is to save taxes.  The expansion of the tax base reduced their 
ability to engage in tax shelter and arbitrage activities.  However, the actual magnitudes of the 
individual responses to these massive federal and state changes in the income remain 




Our analyses are based upon the 1984 and 1989 Individual Tax Model Files (ITMFs) 
from the Statistics of Income of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  These ITMFs are cross-
sectional, microlevel data sets that contain detailed information on individual observations from 
a stratified random sample of U.S. taxpayers; for more detailed information on these data sets, 
see the Internal Revenue Service (1984, 1989).
12  The 1984 ITMF contains 79,556 individual 
                                                                                                                                                             
Behavior,” in Do Taxes Matter? The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Joel Slemrod (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1992, 243-275).  
12  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Individual Public-Use Microdata File (Washington, D.C., 1984); 10 
 
records drawn from a population total of approximately 110 million tax return records, and the 
1989 file contains 96,588 records from a population of 112 million records; in both years high-
income tax returns are significantly oversampled, so that these ITMFs contain perhaps the most 
detailed and comprehensive information available for high-income taxpayers.
13  Each file 
contains roughly 200 variables that represent information coded from actual federal individual 
income tax returns.  The taxpayer name, social security number, and other identifying 
information (other than the primary state of residence) are excluded from the file.  We include 
returns filed by married couples filing jointly and separately and those filed by single individuals, 
and exclude returns filed by heads of households and by dependents.
14 
These ITMFs contain detailed information on taxpayer federal individual income tax 
reporting decisions two years prior to the enactment of TRA86 and one year after TRA86 was 
fully phased in.  They therefore represent taxpayer behavior before individuals began to change 
their behavior in anticipation of the reform and after they had sufficient time to adapt to its 
various provisions.  We also incorporate state income tax systems (where relevant) in order to 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Individual Public-Use Microdata File (Washington, D.C., 1989). 
13  For example, the 1989 ITMF contains 28,042 returns for taxpayers with income above $200,000, or 29.0 percent 
of the total sample of 96,588 returns and 3.6 percent of the estimated high-income population of 789,803 returns. 
14  We exclude dependent returns because of the significant change in tax treatment of such returns between 1984 
and 1989, and we exclude head of household returns because of the relatively small sample size in upper deciles. 11 
 
estimate behavioral responses to combined federal plus state marginal tax rates.
15 
There are several advantages of using the ITMFs to estimate taxpayer responses to tax 
changes.  The ITMFs have incredibly rich information on items reported on the tax returns.  In 
addition, the ITMFs contain very large numbers of observations on individuals at all points in the 
income distribution, especially at higher income levels. 
However, there are several problems with these data, especially relative to panel data sets. 
 One limitation of the ITMFs is the relative lack of demographic information.  Although the 
ITMFs contain virtually all reported tax items, the tax returns contain little information on 
individual characteristics.  Nevertheless, we are able to extract a limited amount of demographic 
information from items reported on the returns.  For example, we infer the age of an individual 
based on their use of the elderly exemption and the number of children from the child 
exemptions claimed on the return. 
Another, more significant, limitation of the ITMFs is that each is a cross-section of 
different individuals at a point in time, so that the same individuals are not included in each of 
the two years.  As pointed out by Navratil (1995) and others, the distribution of income is not 
                                                 
15  In order to calculate the combined federal and state marginal tax rate for each taxpayer and each year for use in 
estimating reporting-tax price elasticities, we supplement the information on federal taxes with information on the 
state individual income tax regimes in each state (where relevant), using detailed state tax calculators for the two 
years.  The state identifier is not available for high-income individuals (or those with AGI over $200,000).  To assign 
state identifiers for these individuals, we first create two groups of high-income returns.  One group consists of all 
high-income returns in the ITMF for which state and local income tax deductions are less than 15 percent of the 
average deduction for all high-income returns (“no income tax” group) and a second group of all other high-income 
returns (“other” group).  We then randomly sample the appropriate group at a rate equal to the percent of high-
income returns reported by the IRS in each state for that year.  For example, California has 16.8 percent of the high-
income returns in 1989; accordingly, we randomly sample 16.8 percent of the “other” high-income group in the 1989 
ITMF, and assign these returns to California.  We repeat the same procedure for each state.  As a check on this 
procedure, we calculate the resulting total AGI by state, and then compare our estimate with that reported by the IRS. 
 In nearly all states, the difference between our estimate and the IRS number is less than five percent; in those cases 
where the difference exceeds five percent, we resample the high-income returns until we obtain a sample high-
income AGI within five percent of reported high-income AGI. 12 
 
constant, and can change for a number of non-tax reasons; relatedly, income growth in the 
different deciles is unlikely to be the same (Piketty and Saez, 2003).
16  The use of cross-sections 
of taxpayers will attribute any changes in the underlying distribution to tax rate changes even if 
the true causes are non-tax-related.  It is partly because of this concern that Feldstein (1995), 
Auten and Carroll (1999), Gruber and Saez (2002), Giertz (2007), and Heim (2009), among 
others, use panel data. 
However, panel data are not without their own problems.  Of perhaps most importance, 
panel data (like cross-section data) are not immune from the necessity of controlling for any 
underlying changes in income that are not tax-related, such as a mean-reverting component to 
income in any given year.
17  In this regard, we have explored several methods that attempt to 
control for underlying trends in the distribution of income by adjusting the 1984 and 1989 cross-
sections for secular changes in the distribution, with largely similar results, and we discuss these 
methods later.  Also, we have examined various aspects of the individuals in the two years, and 
their characteristics in such dimensions as proportions that are elderly or married are generally 
similar over time.
18 
For each of the two years, we select from each return the levels of reported wages and 
salaries, interest income, dividend income, capital gains income, and adjusted gross income 
(AGI).  We also calculate a measure of total (or “comprehensive”) income, as the sum of AGI, 
                                                 
16  Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 118, No. 1 (2003): 1-39. 
17  If there is mean-reversion, then a higher income taxpayer in one year will tend to become a lower income taxpayer 
in the next year, and this change in reported income will be incorrectly attributed to marginal tax rate changes. 
18  Note that in other work we have examined the reporting responses of taxpayers using different years as the basis 
of comparison (e.g., 1992 versus 1995). See: James Alm and Sally Wallace, “Are the Rich Different?” in Does Atlas 
Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich, Joel Slemrod (ed.) (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, 165-187).  13 
 
social security income not included in AGI, dividends not reported in AGI, pension income not 
reported in AGI, and capital gains not reported in AGI, retirement contributions, and self-
employed health insurance deductions.  This definition of total income captures as much of an 
individual's income as can be measured using tax return information, and also gives a consistent 
definition of total income over time.
19  Our intent is to compare the levels of these various types 
of income that individuals report in 1984 and in 1989, holding constant as many factors as 
possible that might affect the amounts of reported incomes.  To do this, we must consider secular 
trends in nominal per capita income, pre- and post-TRA86, as well as any purely structural 
changes in the definition of the income tax base.  These adjustments are discussed in more detail 
later. 
Table 1 contains summary information on the mean levels of income types by total 
income class for 1984 and 1989, holding prices constant at 1989 levels, where the 1
st decile 
represents the poorest 10 percent of the population as measured by total income.  For the full 
sample, the levels of mean income for each income type increased over this period, other than for 
capital gains income.  However, this overall increase was very unevenly distributed across 
income deciles, and occurred largely because of increases in mean income levels at the top 
income levels.  For example, mean total income for each of the bottom nine deciles remained 
roughly constant from 1984 to 1989; only for the 10
th decile did mean total income increase, by 
6.5 percent, driven largely by an increase in wages and salaries and interest income.  Mean 
income levels from interest and dividend incomes changed erratically for most deciles, although 
                                                 
19  Note that total income does not include such items as nonretirement transfer payments, fringe benefits, unrealized 
capital gains, and underreported income, items about which there is no information on the individual tax return; it 
also does not include income that is mistakenly or purposely underreported or that is not reported at all on returns. 14 
 
the average amounts of these income types increased for the full sample.  Capital gains income 
exhibited a slightly downward trend for most deciles, and fell significantly for the top deciles.
20  
These changes in income are consistent with other evidence on distributional changes over this 
period.
21 
[Table 1 about here] 
As for the shares of income, calculated as the share of each income type relative to total 
income, these shares changed somewhat unevenly for many of the deciles even over this short 
period.  For example, the share of wages and salaries in total income fell from 74.5 percent (or 
$22,691/$30,460) in 1984 to 70.4 percent in 1989 for the full sample, and generally fell for the 
bottom nine deciles.  However, the share of wages and salaries in total income rose slightly for 
the 10
th income decile (from 58.9 percent to 59.1 percent), and rose even more for the top 5 
percent (50.0 percent to 52.0 percent) and the top 1 percent (33.8 percent to 39.8 percent) of 
individuals.  Interest income also tended to decline as a share of total income for most lower 
                                                 
20  It should be noted that capital gains income for the bottom decile is generally higher than for the next four or five 
income deciles.  This occurs largely because some otherwise low-income individuals (e.g., the elderly) received large 
amounts of capital gains income from the sale of assets.  Similarly, many individuals in the bottom decile receive 
relatively large amounts of income from interest and dividend income. 
21  For discussions of the overall distributional changes in the last several decades in the United States, see: Frank 
Levy and Richard J. Murname, “U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review of Recent Trends and 
Proposed Explanations,” The Journal of Economic Literature 30, No. 3 (1992): 1333-1381; Dimitri B. 
Papadimitriou and Edward N. Wolff (eds.), Poverty and Prosperity in the USA at the End of the Twentieth Century 
(New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, American Unequal (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Peter Gottschalk and Timothy M. Smeeding, “Cross-National 
Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality,” The Journal of Economic Literature 35, No. 2 (1997): 633-687.  
For discussions that emphasize the impacts of taxes, see also: Daniel R. Feenberg and James M. Poterba, “Income 
Inequality and the Incomes of Very High Income Taxpayers,” in Tax Policy and the Economy, James M. Poterba 
(ed.) (Boston, MA: The MIT Press, 1993, 145-177); and Emmanuel Saez, “Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax 
Rates, 1960-2000: Evidence and Policy Implications,” in Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 18, James M. 
Poterba (ed.) (Boston, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004, 117-174).  For some international 
experiences, see: Chiaki Moriguchi and Emmanuel Saez, “The Evolution of Income Concentration in Japan, 1885-
2005: Evidence from Income Tax Statistics”, The Review of Economics and Statistics 90, No. 4 (2008):713-734; 
Facundo Alvaredo and Emmanuel Saez, “Income and Wealth Concentration in Spain in a Historical and Fiscal 
Perspective”, Journal of the European Economic Association 7, No. 5 (2009):1140–1167. 15 
 
income deciles, but trended slightly upward for the full sample, driven again by changes in the 
10
th income decile.  It is of some note that the ratio of AGI to total income increased for all 
income deciles (other than the 1
st decile), and increased most for the top 5 percent (from 78.5 
percent to 95.0 percent) and the top 1 percent (from 69.4 percent to 93.9 percent).  This change is 
consistent with the base-broadening measures in TRA86.  Table 1 also shows the average 
marginal tax rates (federal plus state) by total income class, calculated as a simple arithmetic 
average of the simulated marginal tax rates in each class.  Overall, federal and state income tax 
changes resulted in a slight reduction in the average marginal tax rate, from 21.95 to 20.37 
percent for the full sample.  The largest absolute and percentage reductions occurred for higher 
total income classes. 
We use these files to estimate the responses of individuals in their reporting behavior to 
changes in the federal and state individual income taxation arising from TRA86.  We estimate 
the responses of individuals in their reporting decisions, focusing upon the impact of TRA86 on 
wages and salaries, AGI, and total income. 
It should be emphasized that this reporting response is likely to vary for individuals at 
different levels of income and with different forms of income.  As noted above, the magnitude of 
the change in incentives faced by high income individuals is significantly different than that 
faced by lower income individuals.  Also, the ability to vary the reporting of wages and salaries is 
not likely to be the same as that for AGI or total income.  The next subsection discusses our 




Our intent is to compare the levels of the various types of income that individuals report 
in 1984 and in 1989, holding constant as many factors as possible that might affect the amounts 
of reported incomes.  To do this, we must apply a consistent definition of income over time in 
order to control for any purely structural changes in the definition of the income tax base, and our 
measures of income employ a constant definition of income.  For example, for dividend and 
capital gains incomes we add back the portion of each that is not included in AGI so that our 
measure represents the true level of each income type actually received.  Of more importance, 
like all others who examine taxpayer responses, we must also control for any underlying changes 
in income that are non-tax-related.  This requires us to consider secular trends in nominal 
income, pre- and post-TRA86, in order to adjust all nominal components in 1989 reported 
income so as to control for non-tax-related factors that affected income over the 1984 to 1989 
period. 
To make these “adjustments”, we explore several alternative methods.  The one that we 
emphasize and report here is as follows. 
We calculate, by income quintile and by income type, the actual average income reported 
for each year over the 1982 to 1989 period, using the sample of individual income tax returns 
from the IRS Statistics of Income.
22  For each type of income (e.g., wages, AGI, and 
comprehensive income), we have five observations (or one for each quintile) for each of the eight 
years, for a total of 40 observations for each income type.  We deflate these income levels to 
1984 levels.  We then estimate three separate equations, one for each income type, to predict the 
real level of income by quintile.  Each equation is an OLS regression of the real reported level of 
                                                 
22  1982 and 1983 were selected to increase the number of observations used for the adjustment.  We also performed 17 
 
income by type, as a function of real gross domestic product, the unemployment rate, four 
dummy variables for the income quintiles, and a time trend.  The results of the estimation are 
used to calculate the predicted values of real income by type and by income quintile by year.  In 
these predicted levels of income, we believe we have controlled for the overall changes in the 
economy (e.g., gross domestic product, unemployment, and general trends in income growth).
23  
Finally, we calculate the difference between the predicted real value of income in 1989 and the 
actual (or unadjusted) 1989 reported real value by quintile, and we then adjust the 1989 real 
levels by the difference.  For example, the predicted real wage income for the lowest quintile for 
1989 is $2,432 and the real reported level is $2,036.  Therefore, for every observation in the first 
quintile in our data set for 1989, we adjust real wage income upwards by 19.4 percent. We repeat 
                                                                                                                                                             
the same adjustments using the Current Population Survey, and found similar results. 
23  To illustrate, the unadjusted distribution of real wages by year from the panel data file is: 
Real Wage Income  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Quintile 1  2432  2153  2373  2522  2318  2440  2551  2036 
Quintile 2  6701  6026  6662  6962  6792  7257  7296  6461 
Quintile 3  12496  11899  11973  12427  12424  12631  12584  12289 
Quintile 4  20996  20308  19149  21138  20545  21068  21032  20200 
Quintile 5  40225  39178  39604  40207  39214  42615  40172  40593 
Our estimated equation is: 
Wt = 84366 + 1.63*(RealGDPt) + 5.64*(UnemploymentRatet) –37872* D1 – 33456* D2  – 27885* D3  
 – 19671*D4 – 409.2*Year  (R
2=0.99), 
where t = 1982,…,1989, RealGDPt is real GDP in year t, UnemploymentRatet is the unemployment rate in year t, Di 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for quintile i and 0 otherwise (i = 1,…,4, with the fifth quintile the omitted category), 
and Trend is a time trend.  The predicted values of real wage income are: 
Predicted Real Wage Income  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Quintile 1  2107  1995  2124  2654  2564  2475  2477  2432 
Quintile 2  6523  6412  6540  7069  6980  6891  6893  6848 
Quintile 3  12094  11983  12111  12641  12551  12462  12464  12419 
Quintile 4  20308  20195  20324  20854  20765  20676  20678  20633 
Quintile 5  39979  39868  39996  40526  40437  40347  40350  40304 
For example, in 1983 (arguably one of the more stable years during this period in terms of tax changes) our income 
adjustment model predicts an average real wage in quantile 1 of $1995, while the actual real wage was $2153, for a 
difference of 7.3 percent; the difference between the predicted and actual real wages for quantiles 2 through 5 in 
1983 is between -6.0 to 0.5 percent.  In 1984, the difference for quantiles 2 to 5 is between -6.1 and 1.8 percent , 
while the lowest quantile is different by 10.5 percent. 18 
 
this exercise for each type of income.  It is these adjustments that attempt to control for non-tax-
related factors that could influence our estimates.  With these adjustments, any remaining 
differences in the adjusted 1989 values are, we believe, more likely attributable to the changes in 
tax law than are the original unadjusted values.
24 
It should be noted that our adjustments are still subject to some limitations.  In estimating 
these regressions, we of course leave out the potential impact of tax rates, which are likely 
correlated with some of our explanatory variables; that is, in attempting to net out non-tax 
factors, we are likely netting out at least some of the tax effects.  This factor suggests that any 
estimated reporting responses are likely to underestimate the “true” response.  An additional 
problem is that the quintiles do not contain the same group of individuals over time; with income 
mobility there may be some movement between quintiles, which is one of the main reasons for 
using panel data.  As an extreme example, someone who was in, say, the lowest quintile in 1982-
1983 and in the top quintile in 1988-1989 would have the growth rate of the top quintile imputed 
to him or her when deflating the 1989 income, when actual income growth was much greater; 
again, this factor suggests that our estimated reporting response is likely to underestimate the 
“true” response.  Finally, our approach assumes that income growth within quintiles has been 
constant; the work of Piketty and Saez (2003) and others demonstrates that it is unlikely that is 
the case.   
However, it should also be noted that we tried various other “adjustments” to control for 
non-tax related changes over the period.  For example, we used the average annual growth rates 
from the predicted values (as described above) for the period 1984 to 1989 to adjust reported 
                                                 
24  We are grateful to several anonymous referees for helping us clarify our thinking about these limitations. 19 
 
income items.   In another adjustment method, we calculated, by income quintile and by income 
type, the growth in incomes for all non-tax-reform years in the 1980s (e.g., omitting the years 
1980-1981, 1981-1982, 1984-1985, 1985-1986, and 1986-1987 because of the Reagan tax 
changes and TRA86, and including the years 1982-1983, 1983-1984, 1987-1988, and 1988-
1989); we also performed the same growth calculations with different variants on the years 
included for the growth estimates (e.g., omitting 1987 and 1988 because of the phase-in of 
TRA86), with no appreciable effect on our final results.  We used the calculated income growth 
in these years to obtain average rates of “non-tax-related” income growth for the 1984 to 1989 
period, and we then deflated our 1989 income data to 1984 levels by these average growth rates, 
applying different deflators both by type of income and by income group.  In general, our results 
were robust to these alternative adjustments. 
 
Estimation Methods 
We apply a variety of estimation methods to our adjusted data, in order to identify 
reporting behavior.  The simplest method is OLS estimation.  The basic OLS specification for 
each form of reporting behavior starts as: 
  Y = β X + ε ,                    (1) 
 
where Y is some form of reported income (e.g., wages and salaries), β is a vector of parameters 
(including a constant), X is a vector of individual characteristics, and ε is an error term.  By 
estimating separate equations for the entire sample of returns for each income type, we are able to 
measure differential responses across the various forms of income. 
Individual characteristics include: a dummy variable for Marital Status, equal to 1 if 20 
 
married and 0 otherwise; the number of Children, as reported via dependent exemptions; a 
dummy variable for the receipt of Unemployment compensation, equal to 1 if unemployment 
compensation is reported and 0 otherwise; and a dummy variable for Elderly status, equal to 1 if 
the elderly deduction is claimed and 0 otherwise. 
It seems likely, however, that individual responses will differ at different points in the 
distribution of income.  We use two approaches to measure differential responses.  The first is 
estimation of equation (1) and its variants for each of the five separate quintiles of the entire 
sample, rather than for the entire sample itself.  To do this, we rank all individuals in each year's 
ITMF on the basis of total income, and then estimate separate forms of equation (1) for each 20 
percent subsample grouping and each income type. 
A second and more novel approach to estimating differential taxpayer responses is 
quantile regression (Koenker and Basset, 1978; Koenker and Hallock, 2001).
 25   Unlike OLS 
estimation for the entire sample, which generates a single vector of estimated coefficients, 
quantile regression generates a different coefficient vector for each quantile.  Also unlike OLS 
estimation, which minimizes the sum of the squared residuals, quantile regression minimizes the 
sum of the absolute residuals and thereby reduces the influence of outliers.  Although outliers 
obviously exist in any data source, in tax return data they occur frequently and they can be large. 
As an example of the interpretation of quantile results, consider the SOI sample that we 
have, and rank all individuals from lowest to highest in their reporting of, say, wages and 
                                                 
25  Roger W. Koenker and Gilbert Basset, “Regression Quantiles,” Econometrica 46, No. 1 (1978): 43-61; and Roger 
W. Koenker and Kevin F. Hallock, “Quantile Regression,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, No. 4 (2001): 
143-156.  See also: Moshe Buchinsky, “A Monte-Carlo Study of the Asymptotic Covariance Matrix Estimators for 
the Quantile Regression Estimators,” in Theory and Practice of Quantile Regression, Ph.D. Dissertation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1991); and Moshe Buchinsky, “Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure, 1963-
1987: Application of Quantile Regression,” Econometrica 61, No. 4 (1994): 405-458. 21 
 
salaries.  Now suppose that wages and salaries are a linear function of, say, the number of 
children.  If we specify the 50th quantile, then the slope parameter for Children generated from 
quantile regression for the 50th quantile shows the change in the median value of wage income 
(conditional upon children) for a change in the number of children.  More generally, the slope 
coefficient for any given quantile shows how the wage quantile (conditional upon the number of 
children) changes as the number of children changes.  Put differently, for every possible number 
of children (X), there is an observed conditional distribution of wages and salaries (Y │X).  These 
conditional distributions have means and quantiles.  Coefficients of a mean regression are 
estimates of the marginal effect of X on the conditional mean of Y; in contrast, coefficients of a 
quantile regression are estimates of the marginal effect of X on the conditional quantile of Y. 
Note that the quantile ranking for wages and salaries is based only upon wages and 
salaries, not on total income.  Consequently, the same individuals are not necessarily in the same 
quantiles when we estimate the separate equations for wages and salaries, interest income, 
dividend income, capital gains income, AGI, and total income. 
In OLS regressions with the full sample, the OLS subsample quintile regressions, and the 
quantile regressions, we apply a difference-in-difference estimation approach.  TRA86 
constituted a significant break from previous tax policy.  If we can control for the major 
influences on reporting behavior that reflect such things as the growth in income over time, 
changes in the definition of the tax base, and other factors as discussed later, then any differences 
in reported incomes that we observe between 1984 and 1989 will be largely due to modifications 
in individual behavior in response to TRA86.  More precisely, suppose that TRA86 affects one 
group of taxpayers (the treatment group) but not another group (the control group).  If we 22 
 
measure the change over time in the response of each group (the group difference), then the time 
difference between these group responses is the “difference-in-difference” estimate of the impact 
of TRA86. 
It should be noted that the use of this approach is not without some difficulties.  As 
emphasized by Heckman (1996) and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), the approach 
assumes (among other things) that the experiment affected only the treatment group and that 
other events over the period affected both groups equally.
26  However, we believe that we are 
able to control sufficiently for these other events in our various estimations.  Our controls are 
based on several factors.  Recall that we adjust our 1989 income levels for non-tax-related 
changes that occurred during the 1980s.
27  Recall also that we adjust all reported items by any 
purely structural changes in the definition of the income tax base over this period (e.g., a constant 
income definition), and that we include a number of individual control variables as explanatory 
variables in our estimations. 
Finally, we also include in our estimations several variables to achieve identification of 
the effects of TRA86.  We explore three potential sources of identification.  The most obvious 
source is the time-specific factor, or pre- versus post-TRA86.  The time-specific element is 
measured by a dummy variable TRA, equal to 1 for observations after TRA86 and 0 otherwise.  
                                                 
26  James J. Heckman, “Comment,” in Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation, Martin Feldstein and James 
M. Poterba (eds.) (Chicago, IL: National Bureau of Economic Research and the University of Chicago Press, 1996, 
32-38); Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-
differences Estimates?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, No. 1 (2004): 149-275. 
27  For a discussion of the impact of underlying changes in the distribution of income on difference-in-difference 
estimates, see: Austan Goolsbee, “What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive 
Compensation,” The Journal of Political Economy 108, No. 2 (2000a): 352-378; and Austan Goolsbee, “It’s Not 
About the Money: Why Natural Experiments Don’t Work on the Rich,” in Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic 
Consequences of Taxing the Rich, Joel Slemrod (ed.) (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000b, 141-
158): and Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, “The Taxation of Executive Compensation,” Tax Policy and the 23 
 
A second source is individual-specific, for individuals who are high income versus those who are 
low income.  We use here a dummy variable HighIndividualIncome, equal to 1 for individuals 
who are in the 75th percentile or above of total income, and 0 otherwise; this variable also allows 
us to examine differential responses by income class.  Our third source of identification is a state-
specific factor, which looks for differences in behavior between those who live in high-tax states 
versus those in low-tax states.  This variable is called HighStateTax, and equals 1 for individuals 
living in a state whose ratio of taxes to personal income exceeds the 75th percentile of all states, 
and 0 otherwise.   
These variables are introduced as separate dummy variables and as interacted variables.  
Note that we have also estimated variants with different individual and state sources of 




th percentile).  Our results are largely unaffected. 
This discussion suggests that we estimate variants on equation (1).  If the only source of 
identification is time-specific (or TRA), then we estimate 
  Y = β X + φ1 TRA + ε ,                (2) 
 
where Y, X, β, and ε are defined as in equation (1).  The coefficient on TRA, or φ1, represents the 
difference estimator for the effects of tax reform on reporting behavior, and measures the 
difference in reporting of, say, wages and salaries before versus after the enactment of TRA86.  
Other sources of identification are introduced by adding additional dummies and interactions.   
For example, if time-, individual-, and state-specific differences are all included, we estimate 
  Y = β X + φ1 TRA + φ2 HighIndividualIncome + φ3 HighStateTax 
+ φ4 TRA * HighIndividualIncome + φ5 TRA * HighStateTax 
                                                                                                                                                             
Economy, Volume 14, James M. Poterba (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000, 1-44).      24 
 
+ φ6 HighIndividualIncome * HighStateTax 
+ φ7 TRA * HighIndividualIncome * HighStateTax + ε.      (3) 
 
The coefficient φ7 on [TRA * HighIndividualIncome * HighStateTax] is the difference-in-
difference-in-difference estimator for the effects of tax reform on reporting behavior.  It equals 
the change in individual reporting of wages and salaries among high-income (relative to low-
income) individuals in high-tax (relative to low-tax) states after (relative to before) TRA86. 
We apply the difference-in-difference approach to OLS estimation for the entire sample, 
to OLS estimation for the separate total income quintile subsamples, and to quantile regression; 
in the quintile subsamples estimation, we necessarily do not include the HighIndividualIncome 
source of identification.  It should also be noted that we have estimated a very wide range of 
other specifications using our adjusted data.  We have used the shares of the income types as the 
dependent variables.  We have changed the basic specification by including some additional 
variables that reflect some potentially relevant individual circumstances, such as whether the 
individual itemizes deductions on the federal tax return, whether the individual reports income 
from a business or a profession operated as a sole proprietor on Schedule C, and whether the 
individual receives income from rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, estates, 
and trusts (Schedule E).  We have also estimated all specifications using both unweighted and 
weighted ITMF data.  (As noted above, we also applied different methods of adjustment to the 
data, in an attempt to control for non-tax-related factors that could influence reporting behavior.) 
 All results are available upon request.
28 
                                                 
28  In other work (Alm and Wallace, 2000), we have examined the reporting responses of the very rich, defined as 
individuals in the top 0.5 or the top 1 percent of the total income distribution.  Note that Goolsbee (2000a, 2000b) 
presents evidence that the behavioral responses of the very rich were likely due mainly to timing responses; the 
results of Hall and Liebman (2000) are inconclusive.  25 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Some representative estimation results are presented in Table 2 for wages and salaries, 
Table 3 for AGI, and Table 4 for total income.
29  For ease of comparison, only the results with 
TRA (or equation (2)) are reported in Tables 2 to 4.  The elasticities of the relevant reporting 
decision with respect to the net-of-tax rate are summarized in Table 5 for all specifications of 
wages and salaries, AGI, and total income.
30  
[Table 2 about here] 
Consider first the results for wages and salaries, in Table 2.  For the OLS full sample 
estimation, tax reform has a large, significant, and positive impact on the reporting decision.  
However, the results from the OLS subsample quintiles suggest that this result is due mainly to 
responsiveness at the upper end of the income distribution, since the coefficient on TRA, or φ1, 
tends to increase for the upper quintiles, and is largest for the top 20 percent quintile.  The 
quantile regression estimates also suggest that higher income individuals are more responsive to 
tax reform, at least in absolute terms, as shown by the increase in the absolute size of φ1 for 
                                                 
29  We have estimated similar specifications for the various types of capital income (interest, dividend, and capital 
gains income), but these estimations generally perform erratically, in part because of the concentration of capital 
income in a small number of taxpayers and also because of the special treatment of capital income in the tax code.  
These results are not reported. 
30  For example, the tax-price elasticity based upon equation (2), in which only the TRA variable is included, is 
calculated as: 
[ln(Y1989)-ln(Y1984)]/[ln(1-MTR1989)-ln(1-MTR1984)], 
where Y is some type of reported income and MTR is the combined federal-state marginal tax rate, with both indexed 
by the year.  Similarly, with TRA and HighIndividualIncome the elasticity is calculated as: 
[(ln(Y1989,Highincome)-ln(Y1989,Lowincome))-(ln(Y1984,Highincome)-ln(Y1984,Lowincome)] 
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 [(ln(1-MTR1989,Highincome)-ln(1-MTR1989,Lowincome))-(ln(1-MTR1984,Highincome)-ln(1-MTR1984,Lowincome)], 
where Y1989,Highincome is some type of reported income for high-income taxpayers in 1989, and so on.  Other elasticities 
are calculated in a comparable manner. 26 
 
higher quantiles.
31  Recall, however, that the quantile ranking for wages and salaries is based 
only upon wage income, while the OLS subsample quintiles are determined by total income. 
A similar, and even clearer, pattern is shown in Table 3 for AGI.  As with wages and 
salaries, the impact of tax reform on the reporting of AGI is large, positive, and significant for the 
full OLS sample.  However, the OLS subsample quintiles clearly indicate that the positive effect 
of TRA is due largely to the extreme responsiveness of the top quintiles.  The same pattern is 
found in the quantile estimates, where the coefficient on TRA is always significant and increases 
in size as the choice of the quantile increases from .2 to .8.  The estimation results for total 
income (Table 4) are similar if not as striking.  
[Table 3 about here] 
[Table 4 about here] 
When all combinations of identifying variables are estimated (where appropriate) using 
the OLS full sample, the OLS subsample quintiles, and the quantile regressions, TRA is found to 
have a consistently positive impact on the reporting decision of most types of income.  The 
various reporting-tax price elasticity estimates are given in Table 5 for all income types.  There is 
a some tendency for the wage elasticities to be smaller than those for AGI and total income, 
implying that individuals have somewhat less ability to change their reporting of wages than of 
other types of income, but this tendency is not pronounced.  Also, there is a stronger tendency for 
the elasticities to increase both for higher income subsample quintiles and for higher income 
quantiles.  This latter result is consistent with the notion that individuals with higher levels of 
                                                 
31  The standard errors in the quantile regressions are boot-strapped standard errors.  Although consistency of 
bootstrap estimators has not been proven theoretically, Buchinsky (1995) uses Monte-Carlo evidence to suggest the 
consistency of the estimates.  See: Moshe Buchinsky, “Estimating the Asymptotic Covariance Matrix for Quantile 27 
 
income have more flexibility in their reporting decisions.
32 
[Table 5 about here] 
Overall, the elasticities are consistently positive for most income types, with many of 
them clustered roughly between 0.3 and 0.7, a range that makes them comparable in size and sign 
to those calculated by Gruber and Saez (2002), though somewhat smaller than those in Feldstein 
(1995) and Auten and Carroll (1999). 
However, there is significant variation in the tax price elasticities, especially across 
estimation method.  For example, elasticities from the OLS subsamples quintiles are often 
insignificant and sometimes quite small, while the quantile elasticities are nearly always positive 
and generally larger.   
It is also important to note that the estimated responses are somewhat affected by 
adjustments to the data that attempt to capture any underlying but non-tax-related changes in 
income that occurred over this period.  Recall that we generated the estimation results in Tables 2 
to 4 by adjusting all nominal amounts of 1989 reported incomes by the predicted rate of growth 
of these incomes over the period of the 1980s.  Suppose, however, that we compare the impact of 
TRA on wages and salaries, AGI, and total income, when we use the original unadjusted data (or 
data without any adjustment for income growth overt the period) versus the adjusted data (as in 
Tables 2 to 4).  Table 6 reports only the coefficient on TRA for these alternative estimations, 
where the coefficients for the adjusted data are identical to the earlier estimates.  We see that the 
estimated impact of TRA varies significantly across the various estimations, sometimes larger 
with the adjusted data and sometimes smaller.  In general, however, it is evident that the failure 
                                                                                                                                                             
Regression Models: A Monte Carlo Study,” Journal of Econometrics 68, No. 3 (1995): 303-338. 28 
 
to consider non-tax-related factors would tend to generate different estimates of the impact of tax 
reform on the reporting decision.  
[Table 6 about here] 
The signs on the control variables are generally consistent with expectations.  With some 
occasional exceptions, married individuals, couples with children, and individuals who itemize 
tend to have higher forms of all reported incomes.  In contrast, individuals who receive 
unemployment compensation typically have lower reported incomes of all types.  Not 
surprisingly, the elderly dummy variable has a negative impact on the reporting of wages and 
salaries, an impact that does not vary much with income class in the quantile results; however, 
for other income types, Elderly sometimes has a significant and positive effect on reporting, 
especially for higher quintiles or quantiles and especially also for income from capital. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
There now seems little question that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affected the reporting 
decisions of most individuals, and our estimation results point consistently to a significant 
increase in reported income in response to the lower marginal tax rates enacted under TRA86.  
However, our results also suggest that there are important differences in the estimated reporting 
responses across the various types of income, across income classes, across estimation methods, 
and across data adjustment methods.  Taxpayer responses to marginal tax rates tend to be smaller 
for wages and salaries than for other forms of income in which individuals have more discretion 
in the timing of their receiving and report to be smaller for individuals with lower levels of 
                                                                                                                                                             
32  Gruber and Saez (2002) find a similar result.  See also Saez (2004). 29 
 
income because these individuals also have less flexibility in their decisions.  Taxpayer responses 
also tend to be sensitive to the method of estimation (as well as to slight changes in relevant 
parameter values).  Finally, taxpayer responses tend to be lower when the data are adjusted for 
non-tax-related factors that may have affected reporting behavior during the 1980s.  
The ability of any tax increase to generate greater tax revenues depends critically on the 
magnitude of these estimated responses, in particular on the elasticity of the tax base with respect 
to the tax price of reported income.  For a constant tax base, an increase in the tax rate will 
generate greater revenues in proportion to the increase in the tax rate.  However, if the tax base 
elasticity is not zero, then a higher tax rate will also shrink the tax base; whether a higher tax rate 
generates higher tax revenues then depends upon the relative responses of the tax rate and the tax 
base.  To illustrate this tradeoff, the revenue impacts of a constant ten percent change in the tax 
rate are shown in Table 7, under the assumption that the tax base B is a simple constant-elasticity 
function [A(1-t)
η], where t is the tax rate, A is an arbitrary constant, and η is the elasticity of the 
tax base with respect to the tax price of reported income; revenues therefore equal tB or [tA(1-
t)
η].
33  As shown in Table 7, if the elasticity is 0, then a ten percent increase in the tax rate will 
always generate an equal ten percent increase in tax revenues, regardless of the level of the initial 
tax rate.  However, the revenue-raising ability of a higher tax rate is significantly reduced for 
even a modest tax base elasticity.  For example, when the tax base elasticity equals 0.4, 
increasing the tax rate by ten percent from its initial level of 50 percent will increase revenues by 
only 5.46 percent; a higher tax rate will actually reduce revenues once the initial tax rate exceeds 
                                                 
33  For example, when the initial tax rate is 30 percent, revenues are calculated for a tax rate of 30 percent, and are 
then calculated again for a higher tax rate of 33 percent.  The difference is expressed in percentage terms relative to 
the initial level of revenues. 30 
 
roughly 70 percent.  Even more strikingly, if the tax base elasticity equals only 1.0, then revenues 
will begin to fall with a higher tax rate once the tax rate exceeds only 1/2. 
[Table 7 about here] 
As emphasized earlier, there are good reasons for cautious interpretation of these, or any 
other, results.  Even though we have attempted to control for non-tax-related factors that may 
have contributed to changes in reporting behavior, we must admit that it is still risky to attribute 
all of these changes in reporting directly to the changes in taxation represented by TRA86.  Also, 
TRA86 changed a number of features of the income tax, not simply marginal tax rates, and the 
elasticity estimates necessarily attribute all impacts of the reform to changes in marginal tax 
rates.  In sum, disentangling the effects of taxes is, and will likely remain, a difficult proposition. 
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  TABLE 1 
  MEAN LEVELS OF INCOME TYPES AND AVERAGE MARGINAL TAX RATES 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  TABLE 2 
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  TABLE 3 
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  TABLE 4 



















































































































































































































































  TABLE 5 








































































































































































































































































NS denotes that the elasticity is Not Significant (at 0.05 or better), based upon significance of the estimated coefficient. 36 
 
TABLE 6 
  COMPARISON OF TRA IMPACTS: ADJUSTED VERSUS UNADJUSTED DATA 













































Wages and Salaries                       
   Adjusted Data  4846***  909***  768***  1616***  1583***  9477***  2436***  2416***  2082***  2386***  4468*** 
   Unadjusted Data  4460***  174  475**  1297***  1290***  9146***  2171***  2168***  3831***  3414***  4084*** 
AGI                       
   Adjusted Data  7773***  -293  1630***  1962***  3106***  15024***  2834***  1612  4097***  7064***  7342*** 
   Unadjusted Data  6696***  -4-4  426***  824***  1959***  13693***  1851***  1239***  3723***  4245***  6331*** 
Total Income                       
   Adjusted Data  6940***  -100  2782***  2218***  2350***  5612  4123***  5209***  5019***  5790***  6395*** 
   Unadjusted Data  4716***  -651  122**  -43  17  2507  4073***  2662***  1661***  1630***  1590 
 
*** : P=0.001; 
**: P=0.01; 
*: P=0.05. 37 
 
TABLE 7 
  CHANGE IN REVENUES FROM A 10 PERCENT INCREASE IN THE TAX RATE
a 
(in percent) 
  Tax Base Elasticity 
Initial Tax Rate  0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0  1.5  2.0  3.0  4.0  5.0 
10%  10.00%  9.75%  9.51%  9.27%  9.02%  8.78%  8.17%  7.57%  6.37%  5.19%  4.02% 
20%  10.00  9.44  8.89  8.34  7.79  7.25  5.90  4.57  1.95  -0.59  -3.08 
30%  10.00  9.04  8.09  7.15  6.21  5.29  3.00  0.77  -3.55  -7.68  -11.64 
40%  10.00  8.49  7.01  5.54  4.09  2.67  -0.81  -4.18  -10.57  -16.53  -22.09 
50%  10.00  7.71  5.46  3.26  1.11  -1.00  -6.08  -10.90  -19.91  -27.83  -35.05 
60%  10.00  6.48  3.08  -0.22  -3.41  -6.50  -13.80  -20.53  -32.45  -42.58  -51.19 
70%  10.00  4.31  -1.09  -6.21  -11.06  -15.67  -26.16  -35.34  -50.43  -62.00  -76.66 
80%  10.00  -0.68  -10.33  -19.04  -26.90  -34.00  -48.88  -60.40  -76.24  -85.74  -91.45 
90%  10.00  -30.59  -56.21  -72.37  -82.57  -89.00  -96.52  -98.90  -99.89  -99.99  -100.00 
 
Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate (in percent)
b  100.00  83.33  71.43  62.50  55.56  50.00  40.00  33.33  25.00  20.00  16.67 
a  Revenues are assumed to equal the constant elasticity function [tA(1-t)
η], where t is the tax rate, A is an arbitrary constant, and η is the tax base elasticity.  The change in revenues 
is calculated by increasing the initial tax rate by 10 percent, and expressing the change from the initial level in percentage terms. 
b The revenue-maximizing tax rate is calculated (1/(1+η)), where η is the tax base elasticity.  